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I. INTRODUCTION
When a robot hurts a human, how should the legal system respond? Our
first instinct might be to ask who should pay for the harm caused, perhaps
deciding to rest legal liability with the robot's hardware manufacturer or its
programmers. But besides considering tort or criminal actions against
corporate and human persons, legal actors might also target the most
immediate source of the harm the robot itself.
The notion of holding a robot accountable for its actions initially evokes
absurd and amusing mental images-a prosecutor pointing to a smart toaster
shouting, "And what do you have to say in your defense? Jury, note that the
toaster says nothing. It says nothing because it is guilty." And it is easy to
laugh at this scenario and brush the idea aside. But there are more rational
ways to hold robots accountable for their actions and reasons why law and
policy makers would want to do so.
* Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thank you to Ryan Calo, Kate
Darling, Woodrow Hartzog, Alex Lemann, and the participants in the 2017 Nebraska-Brooklyn
Junior Technology Law Scholars Workshop and the 2017 Junior Faculty Workshop series at
Brooklyn Law School.
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This Essay proceeds by first exploring how vengeful responses to
wrongdoing may provide significant psychological benefits to victims (Part
II). It goes on to argue that taking revenge against wrongdoing robots,
specifically, may be necessary to create psychological satisfaction in those
whom robots harm and addresses the concern that punishing robots would
psychologically injure humans (Part III). The Essay then shifts focus to robots
themselves, arguing that it is justifiable for humans to blame robots for their
actions because, like animals, autonomous robots are best understood as the
causes of their own actions (as "agents") (Part IV). Finally, the Essay
evaluates whether a robot's moral culpability is relevant to the issue of robot
punishment (Part V) and considers how revenge against robots could be
implemented (Part VI).
II. SEEKING SATISFACTION THROUGH REVENGE
When asked what the goal of tort law is, many say that its goal is "to make
victims whole."' "Making a victim whole" is usually understood to mean
returning a victim to the position they were in before a harm occurred or
placing a victim in the position they would have been in had they not been
1. See 1 MARILYN MINZER ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 3.01, at 3-4 (2002)
("The general purpose of compensatory damages in tort actions is to give the injured person a
sum of money which will restore him, as nearly as possible, to the position he would have been
in if the wrong had not been committed; in other words, to make the plaintiff whole."); W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 7 (4th ed. 1971) (explaining that the
purpose of a tort action is to compensate victim for damage he has suffered); Heidi Li Feldman,
Harm and Money, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1567, 1577-80 (1997) (discussing various courts' approaches
to making tort victims whole); Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, 60 EMORY
L.J. 585, 608 (2011) ("No matter one's theory of tort law, the dominant view of tort
compensation is that damages are supposed to return individual plaintiffs to the status quo
ante .... '); Pam Mueller, Victimhood andAgency: How Taking Charge Takes Its Toll, 44 PEPP.
L. REV. 691, 693-97 (2017) (citing cases that articulate the goal of making victims whole); Ellen
S. Pryor, Rehabilitating Tort Compensation, 91 GEO. L.J. 659, 660-61 (2003) (stating that "a
dominant theme" among legal academics and practitioners is that tort law is designed to return
plaintiffs to the status quo ante); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice,
91 GEO. L.J. 695, 749 (2003) ("Our tort system clearly puts great emphasis on damages, and
particularly on compensatory damages. In so doing, it obviously makes use of the concept of
making whole, and of a principle that the plaintiff is entitled to be made whole"); Mary Alice
McLarty, Medical Malpractice Remedies, 49-MAY TRIAL 6 (2013) (in which the then-president-
elect of the Dallas Trial Lawyers stated, "As trial lawyers, we know the purpose of tort law is to
make injured people whole"); cf Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264-65 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Like the common law of torts, the statutory employment 'tort'
created by Title VII has two basic purposes. The first is to deter conduct which has been
identified as contrary to public policy and harmful to society as a whole. . . . The second . .. is
to make persons whole for injuries suffered ..... (internal quotations omitted)).
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injured. 2 In practice, this means awarding tort victims financially.3 When a
pedestrian gets hit by a car and physically injured, they can sue the car's driver
and may receive as compensation the cost of their medical bills, lost wages
from the injury, and even an approximation of the value of their physical pain
and suffering.4 But consider for a moment an alternate society where, instead
of suing the driver, an injured pedestrian appeals to a government body or a
private charity to cover the cost of the accident. In this society, governments
or charities are very generous, and injured individuals receive in
compensation the same as or more than they would have received in our more
litigious society. Plus, the procedure is fast and efficient and does not require
long, contentious legal battles. Your instinct may be that this alternate society
sounds preferable because injured parties are made whole quicker. But you
might also imagine yourself in that situation and feel a nagging frustration-
the person who caused your injuries does not appear in the story at all. The
driver hit you with a car and then just walked away from the situation. Their
car insurance payments did not even increase. Maybe they never thought
about you again, knowing that existing institutions would make sure you were
taken care of.
One might suppose that this frustration comes from a desire for revenge-
the desire to see the car driver suffer in some way because of the suffering
they inflicted.5 Here, it is useful to distinguish between retribution and
revenge. Retributivists might support the law taking punitive actions because
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977) ("[T]he law
of torts attempts primarily to put an injured person in a position as nearly as possible equivalent
to his position prior to the tort."); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 2 (1996) (stating that compensation
should "put the injured party in the position in which he was before he was injured"); Mueller,
supra note 1, at 695 (citing cases articulating these goals).
3. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 147 (3d ed. 1986)
(stating that "wrongs that subject the wrongdoer to a suit for damages by the victim ... are called
torts"); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 127 (1987) (concluding
that liability translates to damages owed).
4. Feldman, supra note 1, at 1575 ("The traditional tort system requires a tortfeasor to
pay damages for pain and suffering as well as for lost wages and medical expenses.").
5. See Scott Hershovitz, Tort As A Substitute For Revenge, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 87-88 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014) ("The idea that tort suits
are a substitute for revenge is still with us today . . . . On this picture, tort damages are a payoff
to prevent private violence . . .. [Some] suggest that a tort suit provides a plaintiff an opportunity
to take revenge by inflicting harm on the person who harmed her, even when only compensatory
damages are on offer."); Alexander B. Lemann, Stronger Than The Storm: Disaster Law in a
Defiant Age, 78 LA. L. REV. 437, 481-82 (2017) ("[R]eceiving compensation that does not come
from a tortfeasor . .. may make the victim 'whole' by undoing a certain allocation of costs
related to an injury, but it does nothing to offer 'satisfaction' to assert a right to a certain standard
of treatment at the hands of others and thus help the victim get even.").
2018] 581
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the driver deserves to suffer for their wrongdoing. But while retribution
focuses on what a wrongdoer deserves, the notion of revenge additionally
involves a personal desire in the wrongdoer's victim. 6
To the extent that we focus on the effect of revenge on the victim rather
than the wrongdoer, one might be concerned that indulging a desire for
revenge would cultivate socially undesirable behaviors and attitudes in the
victim. One might additionally resist the idea of vengeance, as distinct from
retributive punishment, under a theory that revenge merely harms a
wrongdoer while doing little to benefit society. And depending on the form it
takes, revenge does not necessarily contribute to making the original victim
whole in any concrete sense; rather, as Mahatma Gandhi purportedly said,
"An eye for an eye leaves the whole world blind." 7
Yet this understanding of revenge omits a consideration of the
psychological benefit that revenge might create in harmed individuals-
satisfaction' which is more defensible as an outcome the law and society
should support. The purpose of revenge may initially seem to be to inflict
harm on a wrongdoer, but revenge (as contrasted with retribution) is more
precisely conceived of as the means and not the end. The end of revenge is
satisfaction the re-establishment of the social standing and power balance
between the wrongdoer and victim so that, in the eyes of any of the wrongdoer,
the victim, or third parties, the noneconomic injury committed against the
victim has been set aright.9
Psychology research indicates that satisfaction is a complicated state-it
is not simply created by inflicting harm on a wrongdoer.' 0 However, while
6. See ROBERT NOzICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 367 (1981) (distinguishing
revenge from retribution).
7. See YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 269-70 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006).
8. Satisfaction, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (stating, among other
definitions, that satisfaction is "the atoning for ... an injury, offence, or fault by reparation,
compensation, or the endurance of punishment" and "to be avenged on an offender").
9. See Hershovitz, supra note 5, at 92-95; id. at 98 ("Revenge is rarely just a private
performance."); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 25 (1988)
(stating "our self-respect is social"); Pamela Hieronymi, Articulating an Uncompromising
Forgiveness, 62 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 529, 546 (2001) ("I suggest that a past
wrong against you, standing in your history without apology, atonement, retribution,
punishment, restitution, condemnation, or anything else that might recognize as a wrong, makes
a claim. It says, in effect, that you can be treated this way, and that such treatment is
acceptable.").
10. See e.g., Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., The Paradoxical Consequences ofRevenge, 95 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1316, 1324 (2008) ("[R]evenge has hedonic consequences that
are the opposite of what people expect. Revenge can prolong peoples' hedonic reactions to a
582 [VOL. 69: 579
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harming wrongdoers alone may not be satisfying to parties seeking revenge,
one psychological study has demonstrated that vengeance is satisfying when
the objects of revenge are not only harmed but also recognize that their earlier
actions resulted in their later suffering. "
Psychological satisfaction need not only be achieved by a combination of
acknowledgement and harm. A third party's judgment could generate the
effect as well, such as when courts, the press, or one's social circle state and
agree that an alleged wrongdoer is at fault. Scholars have argued that one role
of the court process is to create a shared narrative of what "the truth" of a
situation is.1 2 Psychological studies show that victims who act as agents and
tell their stories in court are more likely to feel positively about the outcome
of their cases, even though they are less likely to be as highly economically
compensated as someone who takes less of an active role in telling their story
or moving their case forward.1 3 Other work indicates that court judgments
affirm a plaintiff s worth to their community or society.1 4 Even the availability
of "nominal damages" exemplifies how the public nature of the court system
can provide satisfaction in cases where what a victim really wants is an
acknowledgement by an authority figure or society that they were wronged.' 5
transgression because punishing others can cause people to continue to think about (rather than
to forget) those whom they have punished.").
11. Mario Gollwitzer et al., What Gives Victims Satisfaction When They Seek Revenge?,
41 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 364, 364-74 (2011); see also Eric Jaffe, The Complicated Psychology
of Revenge, ASS'N FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL SC.: OBSERVER (Oct. 4, 2011), https://www.
psychologicalscience.org/observer/the-complicated-psychology-of-revenge.
12. See Paul Schiff Berman, Rats, Pigs and Statues on Trial, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 288, 316-
21 (1994); James B. White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX.
L. REV. 415, 444 (1982).
13. See Mueller, supra note 1, at 697-700 and accompanying footnotes.
14. See Kenworthey Bilz, The Puzzle ofDelegatedRevenge, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1059, 1062
(2007); Emily Sherwin, Comments on Stephen Smith's Duties, Liabilities, and Damages, 125
HARV. L. REV. F. 164, 169 (2012) (stating that a "wrong can be viewed as a denigration of the
victim's moral worth" and that "providing the victim with a retaliatory remedy is a way to
recognize, and allow the victim to reassert, moral equality"); Jason M. Solomon, Equal
Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1765, 1795 (2009); Sarah Swan,
Triangulating Rape, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 403, 429 (2013).
15. See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 17 (2017) ("Nominal damages are not compensation for loss
or injury but rather recognition of a violation of rights; they are a symbolic recognition of harm
that may be awarded without proof of actual harm and have only declaratory effect."); see also
Saul Litvinoff & Ronald J. Scalise Jr., 6 LA. CV. L. TREATISE, LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE
LOUISIANA JURISPRUDENCE § 7.21 (2d ed.) ("[T]he symbolized conclusion [in granting nominal
damages] is that the court regards the defendant's conduct as reprehensible even if it has not
caused actual, or measurable, loss to the plaintiff, and that such a defendant should not be let go
without at least a reprimand or a slap on the wrist. In those cases where a mere finding by the
court may be the best satisfaction for the aggrieved party ... the symbolic function of a trifling
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Indeed, some litigants claim that what they really want from the objects of
their lawsuits is a sincere apology. 16 In private life, we are also likely familiar
with situations where two individuals have a personal conflict and appear to
try to convince their mutual acquaintances of "who was right" in the absence
of one party's conceding that they were wrong. These sorts of actions-
apology, making a public statement, and authoritative or public judgment
all serve to provide satisfaction to a victim or party to a conflict by indicating
that the victim or party was in the right.
Satisfaction is ultimately about restoring perceived and real power and
social standing, and a variety of behaviors besides those described above can
reset the power dynamics between two parties. As a historic example, duelists
often evaded physical harm, 7 and no one was necessarily established as the
wrongdoer following a duel." The ritualization of the duel served as a
mechanism by which social standing between two feuding parties could be
restored.19 Although duels served to restore one's standing in the eyes of one's
community, they also served to change the psychological disposition of the
award is evident....") (citing CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, A HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
DAMAGES 95 (1935)); see e.g., Keith Coffman & Jann Tracey, Taylor Swift Wins Groping Trial
Against DJ, Awarded Symbolic $1, REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-people-taylorswift/taylor-swift-wins-groping-trial-against-dj-awarded-symbolic-1-id
USKCNIAU108.
16. JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & VALERIE P. HANS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TORT LAW
20 (2016) ("Many claimants want an apology. Many say they would not have filed a lawsuit if
the other person had apologized; settlement negotiations may stall in the absence of an apology;
and many claimants express disappointment when they do not receive an apology.").
17. In 1817, a British commentator estimated that a duelist had a one-in-four chance of
being killed or wounded. Alison L. LaCroix, To Gain the Whole World and Lose His Own Soul:
Nineteenth-Century American Dueling as Public Law and Private Code, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV.
501, 517 (2004) (citing Antony E. Simpson, Dandelions on the Field of Honor: Dueling, the
Middle Classes, and the Law in Nineteenth-Century England, 9 CRIM. JUST. HIST. 99, 112
(1988)); cf LIN-MANUEL MIRANDA ET AL., Ten Duel Commandments, on HAMILTON
(ORIGINAL BROADWAY CAST RECORDING) (Atlantic Records 2015) ("Most disputes die, and
no one shoots.").
18. See LaCroix, supra note 17, at 521 ("After the first round of fire, the seconds met to
determine whether the injured party's honor had been satisfied, which it often was after a single
round with no injuries.").
19. C.A. Harwell Wells, The End of the Affair? Anti-Dueling Laws and Social Norms in
Antebellum America, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1805, 1823 (2001) ("As one anthropologist explains it,
in a society with such a view of honor 'the being and truth about a person are identical with the
being and truth that others acknowledge in him.' Thus the need for Southern men to participate
in the 'affair of honor,' even when morally opposed to dueling. The point of a duel was not to
reaffirm one's self-worth, but to demonstrate that worth to others.") (citing EDWARD L. AYERS,
VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH-CENTURY AMERICAN
SOUTH 13 (1984)).
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parties with respect to each other. Duelists found themselves in a position of
both deadly power over and vulnerability to their opponent, and in
circumstances where no deadly shots were attempted, a duelist found himself
in both a superior and grateful position: superior because he spared his
opponent when he did not have to, and grateful because his opponent spared
him. The gravity of the moment could be understood as not simply satisfying
arguably-barbaric social expectations, but as genuinely changing the
psychological disposition that the duelists had towards each other.20
III. DIRECTING EMOTIONS AT THE ROBOT
So instead of our original example of the driver and pedestrian, let us
instead consider an autonomous, self-driving car that injures a pedestrian.
When considering how to approach the injured party, we now may be inclined
to ask at least two questions: who should make the pedestrian economically
whole, and how can the pedestrian achieve satisfaction from the aftereffects
of the accident. Depending on the circumstances, we can imagine being
attracted to several options for holding human persons and corporations
accountable for the accident. Of the parties, we could target the hardware
manufacturer or repairer, the software programmers, or even the parties who
chose to install the software in the car. In choosing to privilege valuing safety
or encouraging innovation, we could imagine courts holding these parties to
different standards of liability.2' To encourage innovation, various parties
could be granted immunity for various kinds of accidents, or damages could
be capped. Alternatively, to encourage exacting safety precautions, some
parties could be strictly liable even if they were not at fault.
While our inclinations first may be to ask what legal standards will
encourage innovation and safety, we can also ask what legal frameworks will
provide satisfaction to victims of robot-related accidents. Depending on what
kind of robot we are dealing with and the kind of harm that occurred, the target
of one's need for satisfaction might be quite different. In the case of a
hardware or physical failure, one might direct one's ire to the manufacturers.
In the case of a non-autonomous smart device, where the cause of a problem
20. As an anecdotal example of someone intuitively refusing to put themselves in a
duelist's position and re-establish the social standing between disputing parties, I am reminded
of an apocryphal story of a groom in Texas whose fianc6e had an affair with his best man. The
best man, apologetic upon being discovered, suggested that the groom remedy the situation by
punching the best man in the face. Preferring instead to be done with the friendship rather than
to re-establish their standing with respect to each other, the groom declined the invitation
because his former friend "wasn't worth it."
21. See generally M. Ryan Calo, Open Robotics, 70 MD. L. REV. 571 (2011).
2018] 585
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within the computer's code is clear, one might reasonably be inclined to
criticize the software developer or the party who chose to run the software in
the device. In the case of any computer, if many similar devices are making
the same error, even if we cannot understand why, one might again focus on
the software developer or manufacturer, with an instinct towards the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur-even if we cannot tell exactly what happened, we might
be inclined to think there was negligent design.
But one can also imagine human users' blaming and experiencing anger
with the offending object itself instead of the programmer or manufacturer.
Both current events and fiction suggest this insight is accurate. News reports
about the "drone slayer," who shot down an aerial drone over his house,
illustrate the instinct to target offending objects instead of or in addition to the
human actors responsible for them. 22 Similarly, one of the most famous scenes
in the movie Office Space consists of several characters carrying a frustrating
office printer into an empty field and destroying it with a baseball bat.23
This phenomenon is likely even more pronounced in the case of social
and autonomous robots. "Social robots" are defined by robot ethics researcher
Kate Darling as "a physically embodied, autonomous agent that
communicates and interacts with humans on a social level." 24 Some social
robots only act in predetermined ways, but others are autonomous.
"Autonomous" robots have the ability to "make (limited) decisions about
what behaviors to execute based on perceptions and internal states, rather than
following a pre-determined action sequence based on pre-programmed
commands." 25 Many studies and anecdotes indicate that humans feel more
empathy towards robots the more life-like they seem as they appear more
social and autonomous. 26 This empathy can manifest as a powerful emotional
22. See Cyrus Farivar, Judge Rules in Favor of "Drone Slayer," Dismisses Lawsuit Filed
by Pilot, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 24, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/03/ju
dge-rules-in-favor-of-drone-slayer-dismisses-lawsuit-filed-by-pilot/; James Vincent, Judge
Rules Kentucky Man Had the Right to Shoot Down His Neighbor's Drone, VERGE (Oct. 28,
2015), https://www.theverge.com/2015/10/28/9625468/drone-slayer-kentucky-cleared-charges.
23. See Office Space Movie Clip, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_KinUMIS3Yc
(last visited Mar. 2, 2018); OFFICE SPACE (Twentieth Century Fox 1999).
24. Kate Darling, Extending Legal Protection to Social Robots: The Effects of
Anthropomorphism, Empathy, and Violent Behavior Towards Robotic Objects, in ROBOT LAW
213, 215 (Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 2016).
25. Id. at 215 n.5 (quoting Matthias Scheutz & Charles Crowell, The Burden ofEmbodied
Autonomy: Some Reflections on the Social and Ethical Implications of Autonomous Robots,
WORKSHOP ON ROBOETHICS INT'L CONF. ON ROBOTICS & AUTOMATION 1 (2007)).
26. See Sherry Turkle, In Good Company? On the Threshold of Robotic Companions, in
CLOSE ENGAGEMENTS WITH ARTIFICIAL COMPANIONS: KEY SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL,
ETHICAL AND DESIGN ISSUES 3, 3-10 (Yorick Wilks ed., 2010); Matthias Scheutz, The Inherent
586 [VOL. 69: 579
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aversion to causing robots pain and suffering even though humans
consciously know that the robots are not alive and cannot feel anything.2 7 One
could analogously imagine humans being equally inclined to feel negative or
vengeful emotions towards autonomous, social robots, even if they "know"
that robots are merely objects that run code.
Kate Darling has made a Kantian-style argument28 that even though
robots do not experience suffering, governments should pass laws that protect
robots from cruelty for some of the same reasons that laws against animal
cruelty exist to guide the psychological state of humans who might act
Dangers of Unidirectional Emotional Bonds Between Humans and Social Robots, in ROBOT
ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS 205, 205-22 (Patrick Lin et al.
eds., 2012); Ja-Young Sung et al., My Roomba is Rambo: Intimate Home Appliances, 9TH INT'L
CONF. ON UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 145, 145-62 (2007); see also Darling, supra note 24, at
217-18 ("[R]obots employed within military teams ... evoke fondness and loyalty in their
human teammates, who identify with the robots enough to name them, award them battlefield
promotions and 'purple hearts,' introduce them to their families, and become very upset when
they 'die."') (citing Julie Carpenter, The Quiet Professional: An Investigation of U.S. Military
Explosive Ordinance Disposal Personnel Interactions with Everyday Field Robots (2013)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington) (on file with University of
Washington Libraries)); Michael Kolb, Soldier and Robot Interactions in Combat Environments
(2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma).
27. See, e.g., Kate Darling et al., Empathic Concern and the Effect of Stories in Human-
Robot Interaction, PROC. IEEE INT'L WORKSHOP ON ROBOT & HUM. COMM. (2015),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2639689; Mel Slater et al., A Virtual Reprise of the Stanley Milgram
Obedience Experiments, 1 PLoS ONE, no. 1, e39, at 1-10 (2006), http://journals.plos.org/plos
one/article?id= 10.137 1/journal.pone.0000039; Christoph Bartneck et al., Daisy, Daisy, Give Me
Your Answer Do! Switching Offa Robot, PROC. 2ND ACM/IEEE INT'L CONF. ON HUM.-ROBOT
INTERACTION 217, 217-22 (2007); Christoph Bartneck et al., To Kill a Meekio9gbio Robot,
PROC. 2ND ACM/IEEE INT'L CONF. ON HUM.-ROBOT INTERACTION 81, 81-87 (2007). One
article describes a landmine-diffusing robot that would lose a leg when it stepped on a mine and
continue walking on its remaining legs. The colonel in command of the operation called off the
exercise because he "just could not stand the pathos of watching the burned, scarred and crippled
machine drag itself forward on its last leg. This test, he charged, was inhumane." Joel Garreau,
Bots on the Ground, WASH. POST (May 6, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/05/05/AR2007050501009.html.
28. "[I]f a man has his dog shot, because it can no longer earn a living for him, he is by
no means in breach of any duty to the dog, since the latter is incapable of judgement, but he
thereby damages the kindly and humane qualities in himself, which he ought to exercise in virtue
of his duties to mankind. Lest he extinguish such qualities, he must already practice a similar
kindliness towards animals; for a person who already displays such cruelty to animals is also no
less hardened towards men." IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 212 (Peter Heath & J.B.
Schneewind eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997).
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against them and to reflect moral judgments about how humans should behave
rather than to protect the animals (or robots) themselves.2 9
But, even if torturing innocent robots is psychologically harmful to
humans, enacting revenge on a robot that has caused harm, as part of a formal
process, may not be. Indeed, it may be that vengeance conducted in particular,
formal, sanctioned situations and cultural contexts may cultivate positive
characteristics in vengeful actors, such as repaired self-confidence and
restored feelings of personal autonomy. Although counterintuitive, we can
argue that violence against misbehaving robots is justifiable using reasoning
similar to Darling's: our actions against robots should be chosen based on
what is psychologically beneficial to humans rather than on what the robots
"deserve." If it turns out that punishing robots provides the right kind of
psychological benefit to humans following an injury, we should punish robots.
A practical concern about both this claim and Darling's argument stems
from the fact that humans know robots do not have phenomenal experiences.30
This knowledge seems as though it would undermine the psychological
effects of acting on the robots. Robots don't have feelings, and so while some
people might be psychologically harmed by torturing innocent robots or
psychologically healed by enacting justified revenge on one, others might
have minimal or nonexistent reactions because they have internalized that
robots are "not real." 3' In fact, one might think that we should fight the instinct
to feel emotions for robots because those emotions are just a manifestation of
our brains making an error that we should train ourselves to correct.3 2 Darling
29. Darling, supra note 24, at 226-29; cf Hunter Walk, Amazon Echo Is Magical. It's
Also Turning My Kid Into an Asshole, HUNTER WALK (Apr. 6, 2016),
https://hunterwalk.com/2016/04/06/amazon-echo-is-magical-its-also-turning-my-kid-into-an-a
sshole/ ("Cognitively I'm not sure a kid gets why you can boss Alexa around but not a person.
At the very least, it creates patterns and reinforcement that so long as your diction is good, you
can get what you want without niceties.").
30. "Phenomenal experiences" as in conscious experiences, not super awesome
experiences. See David Woodruff Smith, Phenomenology, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter ed. 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/wi
n2016/entries/phenomenology/.
31. Despite talking about "autonomous" robots, this Essay explicitly does not consider
the question of when a robot stops being a "thing" and becomes intelligent or autonomous
enough to become a rights-bearing "person." The author presumes that all currently-existing and
near-future robots will not be complex enough to raise the question, but that Lieutenant
Commander Data is rights-bearing. See Star Trek: The Next Generation: The Measure of a Man
(CBS television broadcast Feb. 13, 1989) (depicting a trial adjudicating the question of whether
a self-aware android has rights to self-determination). For more on this topic, see Lawrence B.
Solum, Legal Personhoodfor Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1231 (1992).
32. Indeed, a major function of cognitive behavioral therapy is often to teach patients to
adjust their emotional reactions to more reasonably reflect the real stakes of a situation. See
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notes that, in many cases, empathy for robots is counterproductive, recounting
several military operations where soldiers were inclined to make choices to
prevent their robotic tools from getting hurt.33 In light of these real concerns,
Darling concludes that the ultimate answer to how we treat most robots
supervenes on how that treatment affects humans.34 If a behavior is helpful,
we should do it. If it is not, we shouldn't.
IV. ROBOTS AS AGENTS
In the future, more robots will be in a position to run what are called
"black box algorithms"-algorithms that are so complex that even their
designers and programmers cannot explain what the computers running the
algorithms end up doing.3 5 While we might choose to "make people whole"
economically by having the manufacturer, programmer, seller, or insurance
company pay for any harm done by robots that are running black box
algorithms, the actions of rogue robots cannot always neatly be said to be
"caused" by any of these actors.
Suppose someone develops and markets, for instance, a gardening robot
capable of learning new behaviors, and one person's robot starts breaking
ground-floor windows in an apartment building instead of pruning bushes. It
may be that some unusual inputs caused this robot alone to start acting
unexpectedly. The fact that other gardener robots do not start breaking
windows might indicate that this effect was not reasonably foreseeable. It
might also be true that the individuals who programmed the robot would not
SAMUEL T. GLADDING, COUNSELING: A COMPREHENSIVE PROFESSION (7th ed. 2007); see also,
e.g., Alice Boyes, Cognitive Restructuring, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Jan. 21, 2013),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/in-practice/201301,/cognitive-restructuring.
33. Darling, supra note 24, at 217-18 ("[R]obots employed within military
teams ... evoke fondness and loyalty in their human teammates, who identify with the robots
enough to name them, award them battlefield promotions and 'purple hearts,' introduce them to
their families, and become very upset when they 'die."') (citing Carpenter, supra note 26; Kolb,
supra note 26); Kate Darling, Who's Johnny?: Anthropomorphic Framing in Human-Robot
Interaction, Integration, and Policy, in ROBOT ETHICS 2.0: FROM AUTONOMOUS CARS TO
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 173, 174-75 (Patrick Lin et al. eds., 2017) [hereinafter Darling,
Who's Johnny?].
34. See Darling, Who's Johnny?, supra note 33, at 182-83.
35. See W. Nicholson Price II, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37
CARDOzO L. REV. 1401, 1404 (2016) (describing black box algorithms that analyze health
information as "'black-box' precisely because the relationships at [their] heart are opaque not
because their developers deliberately hide them, but because either they are too complex to
understand, or they are the product of non-transparent algorithms that never tell scientists, 'this
is what we found.' Opacity is not desirable but is rather a necessary byproduct of the
development process.").
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be able to explain to you why the robot started breaking windows. (In other
cases, it might be that the harm caused is also too small to justify a true
"autopsy" of what the robot's algorithm was doing.)
So, in the case of the autonomous, black-box-algorithm-running gardener,
what should we say caused the broken windows? We might talk about the
actions of the programmers and manufacturers being necessary conditions for
the windows to break, a few but-for causes among thousands of causes. But,
the nature of learning algorithms prevents these figures' actions from seeming
like proximate causes of the accident. Given the rarity of the gardener's
behavior and the lack of explanation (even in hindsight) for why it occurred,
the window breakage could easily be understood as neither proximately
caused nor reasonably foreseeable by the robot's manufacturers and
developers. Indeed, for the accident to have occurred, there had to be a series
of intervening causes; the robot had to have had a set of experiences that
placed it on a path to break windows instead of prune leaves. As a result, in
cases of robots running black-box algorithms, the best answer to the question,
"What proximately caused this action?" is "The robot." Any other answer
tortures the meaning of 'proximate cause.' And although the law can choose
to find economic liability in parties that did not proximately cause the
accident, human victims cannot necessarily choose to derive satisfaction from
arbitrarily different sources than the apparent cause of their suffering. In this
sense, autonomous robots are much like animals.3 6 Although other parties and
circumstances, including training, can be said to influence them, both
autonomous robots and animals are most reasonably understood as the cause
of their own actions.
Thus, in the case of learning robots, the psychological instinct to blame
the robot does not rest on a fiction. The robot actually did cause the injury,
and not because it was being used by or under the direction of some other
being. As far as humans can understand what happened, the robot is the agent.
And so in this case, the instinct to make the robot the focus of a reaction
against the wrong is not based on a human brain's misunderstanding of what
a robot is. It is, instead, as correct and rational as being upset with a dog for
biting the mailman or a rabbit for eating vegetables in one's garden.
36. See Enrique Schaerer et al., Robots as Animals: A Framework for Liability and
Responsibility in Human-Robot Interactions, 18TH IEEE INT'L SYMP. ON ROBOT & HUM.
INTERACTIVE COMM. 72, 72-77 (2009); David J. Calverley, Android Science andAnimal Rights,
Does an Analogy Exist?, 18 CONNECTION SCI. 403, 403-17 (2006).
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V. THE QUESTION OF MORAL CULPABILITY
Although we might be able to say that an autonomous robot caused a harm
and that no one and nothing else proximately caused the harm, it is worth
considering if proximate cause is enough to override the critique that trying to
exact satisfaction from robots (and animals) remains a misguided endeavor
because these creatures cannot be morally blameworthy.37 Many presume that
moral responsibility attaches because humans with capacity have a choice
over how they behave because when they choose to do wrong they could
have chosen to do otherwise.3 8 Does the sense that blameworthiness
supervenes on the existence of "free will" change whether robots should be
punished for their actions to satisfy their victims? Does it change whether the
victimfeels that the punishment is morally justified?
The answer to both of these questions ought to be "no." Without weighing
in too deeply to the dense philosophical literature discussing free will, we can
recognize that the questions of whether humans have "free will" and what
"free will" even means are among the great intractable problems at the nexus
of philosophy, theology, and physics.3 9 On the one hand, the physical world
seems determined: if I throw a ball at the wall at a certain angle, it always
bounces off the same way. If our brains and bodies simply consist of millions
of small objects moving around, that environment appears to be a more
complex instance of the ball and the wall. On the other hand, there are various
avenues to attack the apparent determinism of the world. We know that the
physical world behaves very strangely when objects are very small.40
37. See Peter M. Asaro, A Body to Kick, but Still No Soul to Damn: Legal Perspectives
on Robotics, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS 169,
176 (Patrick Lin et al. eds., 2012) ("It has been recognized that robots might be treated very
much like domesticated animals, in that they clearly have some capacity for autonomous action,
yet we are not inclined to ascribe to them moral responsibility, or mental culpability, or the rights
that we grant to a human person.").
38. "Most philosophers suppose that the concept of free will is very closely connected to
the concept of moral responsibility. Acting with free will, on such views, is just to satisfy the
metaphysical requirement on being responsible for one's action." Timothy O'Connor, Free Will,
in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring ed. 2002),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2002/entries/freewill/.
39. Indeed, David Hume described the question of what "free will" even is as "the most
contentious question of metaphysics." David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding, in 37 THE HARVARD CLASSICS (P.F. Collier & Son Co. 1910) (1748), at 23,
http://www.bartleby.com/37/3/ 11 .html.
40. See generally Scott Aaronson, The Ghost in the Quantum Turing Machine, in THE
ONCE AND FUTURE TURING (S. Barry Cooper & Andrew Hodges eds., 2016),
http://www.scottaaronson.com/papers/giqtm3.pdf; Jennifer Chu, Closing the 'Free Will'
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Theologians have long argued that there is more to the story than the physical
scenario I described, and philosophers have similarly tried to reconcile notions
of free will with conceptions of a determined or indetermined world.4 ' The
question of what free will is and whether anyone has it is far from settled. As
a result, resting policy or legal consequences on the notion that "one could
have done otherwise" borders on incoherence absent a more robust
description of what "could have done otherwise" means. We could rest legal
distinctions on a weaker, more articulable characterization of free will-that
nothing external to the party in question was forcing its actions and that it did
what it "intended" to do. But if this is what free will means, the concept
applies almost equally to humans, many animals, and autonomous robots.
From this perspective, a robot is just as blameworthy as a human for its actions
and just as deserving of consequences for its actions. The case for robot
vengeance may even be stronger than for a human or an animal; to the extent
that the harm caused by punishment or social judgment is something to be
avoided as a wrong-in-itself, there is no reason to spare the rod because a robot
will experience neither pain nor shame.
In fairness, if we attach moral blameworthiness to understanding one's
actions, blameworthiness might seem to attach to some humans in a way that
it does not to animals or robots.42 However, it may again be difficult to
separate humans from algorithms in this context. A robot might be able to
recall and articulate what it did, just as a human. It may be tempting to claim
that a robot cannot be blameworthy because it cannot explain why it acts, but
often humans cannot satisfactorily explain why they act either. And, if by
"understanding," we mean that something must consciously experience the
connection between cause and effect, we again are thrust into grappling with
longstanding, unsolved philosophical questions: what is consciousness and
what consequences flow from that state?
Questions surrounding what qualities render an actor blameworthy are
vexing. But we need not resolve these questions to decide that revenge against
robots can be appropriate. Even if blameworthiness does not supplement our
account of why vengeance may be justified, it does not diminish other
Loophole, MIT NEWS (Feb. 20, 2014), https://news.mit.edu/2014/closing-the-free-will-
loophole-0220.
41. See generally Michael McKenna & D. Justin Coates, Compatibilism, in THE
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter ed. 2016),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/compatibilism/.
42. Cf ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 205 (Blackfriars 1975) (arguing
that because animals were devoid of understanding, they could not commit a wrong) (cited in
Berman, supra note 12, at 306).
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justifications. Either a robot is as morally blameworthy and as deserving of
penalty or other legal action as a human, or the robot is like a rock and is
neither deserving nor undeserving of any sort of treatment. In both situations,
the robot's moral status does not supply a reason to avoid taking action against
it, given the presence of other reasons to do so.
VI. DESIGNING ROBOT PUNISHMENT
Media studies professor Peter Asaro wonders whether it is even "possible
to punish a robot."4 3 Although robots "have bodies to kick,... it is not clear
that kicking them would achieve the traditional goals of
punishment ... retribution, reform, or deterrence."44 But robot punishment
or more precisely, revenge against robots primarily advances a different
goal: the creation of psychological satisfaction in robots' victims.
What could robot punishment look like? Vengeful behavior seems more
likely to give rise to satisfaction when revenge is accompanied by recognition
that the wrongful behavior led to the vengeful action.4 5 Because a robot may
not be able to recognize its wrongs in a way that humans appreciate, 46 such
procedures ought to be formally sanctioned or publicly recognized by an
authority figure or by members of the public.
We also want to know what the effect of such actions would be on
innocent third-party robot owners. The latter question is partially informed by
the overwhelming criticism of civil asset forfeiture that has developed in
recent years. 47 The criticism, at its core, is that it is unjust for the state to take
property that was used in the commission of a crime from innocent owners
because doing so primarily has the effect of punishing the owner who is
innocent of any wrongdoing. 48 Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of civil
43. Asaro, supra note 37, at 181.
44. Id. at 182.
45. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, Police Use Department Wish List When Deciding Which
Assets to Seize, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/10/us/police-
use-department-wish-list-when-deciding-which-assets-to-seize.html; Conor Friedersdorf, The
Injustice of Civil-Asset Forfeiture, ATLANTIC (May 12, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2015/05/the-glaring-injustice-of-civil-asset-forfeiture/392999/; Sarah Stillman,
Taken, NEW YORKER (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12
/taken; Asset Forfeiture Abuse, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/criminal-law-reform/refor
ming-police-practices/asset-forfeiture-abuse (last visited Feb. 18, 2018); Policing for Profit,
INST. FOR JUSTICE, http://ij.org/report/policing-for-profit/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2018).
48. See Dewan, supra note 47; Friedersdorf, supra note 47. Asset forfeiture is also often
disproportionately targeted at disadvantaged groups. See Rebecca Vallas et al., Forfeiting the
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asset forfeiture is that, with a nod to products liability law, it creates incentives
for individuals to be particularly vigilant about how their property is used, but
there seems to be little evidence that any societal benefit from owner vigilance
outweighs the tremendous harm owners can face when their property is taken
from them due to the actions of another.
But civil asset forfeiture is a different case than robot forfeiture because
civil forfeiture more often involves objects (money, cars, goods) rather than
agents (animals and robots). A robot is the cause of harm in a way that a
(human-driven) car cannot be. The car is a mere tool of a human who intends
or negligently does harm, but an autonomous robot is not merely a tool of
another but is itself an agent. Just as the law sometimes sanctions euthanizing
dangerous dogs over the objections of their owners, 49 the law might
reasonably say that robots who have caused certain kinds of harm are also
forfeit from their owners. Knowing this is possible, robot owners will have
increased incentives to take care in training and controlling their robots (even
though owners cannot know exactly what will work and will not necessarily
have complete control over whether they are successful). The possibility of
having to forfeit the robot might provide incentives for the creation of
insurance against a robot going rogue.5 o Alternatively, though perhaps less
satisfyingly, the law could follow some later incarnations of the medieval
deodand system and allow owners to pay the value of their robots without
giving up the actual objects themselves. 5 '
One could also imagine situations where the notion of separating a rogue
robot from its owner would create a disproportionate burden on the owner, for
example if a robot was unique, unusually expensive relative to the harm
caused, or difficult to replace. In this situation, we could countenance more
modest actions that might still provide a degree of satisfaction to harmed
American Dream: How Civil Asset Forfeiture Exacerbates Hardship for Low-Income
Communities and Communities of Color, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 2016),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/01060039/CivilAssetForfeiture-
reportv2.pdf.
49. See, e.g., CAL. FOOD& AGRIC. CODE § 31645 (West 2001) ("A dog determined to be
a vicious dog may be destroyed by the animal control department when it is found ... that the
release of the dog would create a significant threat to the public health, safety, and welfare.").
50. See Calo, supra note 21, at 609-11.
51. Anna Pervukhin, Deodands: A Study in the Creation of Common Law Rules, 47 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 237, 237 (2005) ("Under [the law of deodands], a chattel ... was deemed to be
a deodand [and was forfeited to the English crown] whenever a coroner's jury decided that it
had caused the death of a human being . . . . In practice, deodands were rarely taken away from
their owners. In most cases, the jury that adjudged the deodand also appraised its value; owners
were then expected to pay a fine equal to the value of the deodand.").
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parties, such as requiring someone to evaluate the robot's code and determine
if there was a way to avoid the future harm, either by adding to the robot's
program or erasing some or all of its memory and forcing it to releam how to
behave.
But at the end of the day, the most satisfying outcome for a person
wronged by a robot might be the early Middle Age practice of "noxal
surrender," wherein "animals or objects causing serious damage or death,
called banes, were handed over directly to a victim or to his family." 52 The
opportunity to take control of a robot for one's own purposes or to destroy it,
when combined with the social signal of being given the device by law, could
together best serve to provide satisfaction to victims. In which case, a wronged
party may indeed be quite justified in dragging a robot out into an empty field
and walloping it with a baseball bat.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Essay makes an outlandish argument, and yet robots are beginning
to make our present environment just as bizarre. Human interactions are
complex and subtle; we are constantly sending each other signals that create
and alter our relationships with one another. Inserting autonomous and social
robots into humans' experiences will alter and confuse those experiences in
ways that are difficult to anticipate. While our collective response will likely
not be to return to a literally medieval system of law, the task of understanding
how the addition of robots into our lives will affect us psychologically and
emotionally remains a critical component of how we address the
technologically changing world.
52. Id. at 241 (citing Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives
on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP.
L.Q. 169, 181 (1973)); THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS 71 (F. L. Attenborough
ed., trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1922). For hundreds of years, legal actions were taken against
animals and objects for the harm they caused to humans. See E.P. EVANS, THE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF ANIMALS (1906); Walter Woodburn Hyde, The
Prosecution and Punishment of Animals and Lifeless Things in the Middle Ages and Modern
Times, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 696, 706 (1916). In Europe and other locations, from around the ninth
to nineteenth century, "[i]ndividual animals were tried usually for killing human beings-in
secular courts according to common law precedents . . . [and] many animals were tried in groups
as public nuisances before ecclesiastical tribunals." Berman, supra note 12, at 289.
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